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Abstract
Following Operation Husky in 1943, Francis Rodd, Lord Rennell (1895–1978) was Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer of AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories) in Sicily and 
Southern Italy. He had previously held important posts in civil affairs in Africa. This article 
examines his approach to politics and military government, with particular reference to his 
support for ‘indirect rule’. This doctrine helped rationalize the fact that British/Allied military 
rule often rested on a small number of staff. Rennell’s thoughts on AMGOT’s administrative 
structures are also covered. A geographer and banker by background, Rennell emerges here as 
a reform-minded pragmatist.
Keywords
Francis Rodd, Lord Rennell, AMGOT, Allied military government, British military administration 
in Africa, indirect rule, the Mafia
In planning for Operation Husky in 1943, a key question for Allied leaders was who 
should lead AMGOT – Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories – the admin-
istration of the newly conquered areas. In particular, it was necessary to decide whether 
a British or American figure should take the lead in what was to be a joint operation. 
After protracted negotiations, the job was handed to an English aristocrat, Lord Rennell 
of Rodd, with the title Chief Civil Affairs Officer. A banker with a combative tempera-
ment, he was to prove a controversial choice. There is an extensive academic literature 
on how AMGOT dealt with the many political, administrative, and social challenges it 
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faced,1 but there is no in-depth study of the principles and mentality of Rennell himself. 
This article will address this by exploring his wartime career in military government. 
Before taking the AMGOT post, he had major responsibilities in civil affairs in Africa, 
including as the War Office’s Chief Political Officer in East Africa in the second half of 
1942. The policies he promoted in Italy had their roots in this African work.
Rennell is interesting for a number of reasons. One of the central aims of this article 
is to explain his application of ‘indirect rule’ to military government. The doctrine of 
indirect rule became something of an orthodoxy in colonial circles in the interwar period, 
especially amongst those who sought to protect African culture from Western modernity. 
But by the Second World War, it was being increasingly questioned, as the concept of 
partnership emerged as an alternative to the more paternalistic idea of trusteeship that 
informed it.2 It was always an imprecise doctrine, left deliberately vague to enable colo-
nial rulers to adapt it to local conditions; indeed it has been argued that the whole direct–
indirect rule dichotomy is too simplistic to be of real analytical value.3 Some have argued 
that indirect rule was never a defined system of administration at all, but more a philoso-
phy and a justification of British rule, where the option to have direct administration did 
not exist.4 It is here that the story of British military administration in Africa and Italy is 
relevant. Finding the personnel to impose direct rule in occupied territories was always 
difficult, hence more indirect methods of administration were attractive. Rennell’s career 
offers a unique perspective on this. Colonial historians writing about indirect rule nor-
mally overlook the legacy of the doctrine in military government. Rennell’s thinking – its 
origins and application – brings the connection between the colonial and military spheres 
into focus.
Rennell’s advocacy of indirect rule, and more generally the pragmatic outlook of 
which it formed a part, help to explain the background to key aspects of AMGOT policy. 
In preparing for the invasion of Sicily, the Americans promoted the idea of replacing 
prominent fascist leaders with Allied soldiers. But the British, and Rennell in particular, 
thought the Allies lacked the personnel to rule Southern Italy directly. As historians of 
the AMGOT operation have noted, Rennell pressed for a gradualist approach, and played 
a key role in persuading the generals Alexander and Eisenhower to embrace a form of 
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indirect rule instead.5 But Rennell’s approach to politics was not purely pragmatic. For 
him indirect rule had an ideological appeal too. He differed from some of his US coun-
terparts in believing that the occupying power should avoid formulating plans for the 
reform of Italy, and instead leave space for the Italians to shape their own political future. 
Indeed, he left Italy in December 1943, in part because he thought the size of the Allied 
Control Commission (ACC) – the successor organization to AMGOT – meant that it 
would tend to interfere too much in matters best left to the Italians themselves. Rennell’s 
convictions were also evident in relation to organized crime. He tried to be tough on the 
Mafia – which underwent some revival under AMGOT. He always rejected post-war 
rumours that the Allies made use of the Mafia for the purpose of prosecuting the war 
more effectively.
Rennell also merits attention for a reason relating to the historiography of British mili-
tary administration in the Second World War: namely the fact that he played a central role 
in shaping it. His book British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa, 
1941–1947 (1948) is the most detailed account of British military rule in wartime Africa.6 
Although not an official history as such, it had something of that character. But it also 
clearly carried the imprint of his own political outlook. In addition, the official British 
history of the allied occupation of Italy, The Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–
1945 by C.R.S. Harris – who had worked for AMGOT as Controller of Property – was 
much influenced by Rennell. As Harris explained in his preface, Rennell personally 
revised the first four chapters – those dealing with the AMGOT period.7 Not all readers 
found the book convincing. One American reviewer of the book complained of a pro-
British bias in the text, citing, for example, criticisms in it of Allied Force Headquarters 
(AFHQ) and the ACC – which were in the chapters revised by Rennell.8 In this context, it 
is important to explore the origins of Rennell’s ideas about military government, for they 
are a guide to how a particular British version of events came to be written.
I
Rennell inherited his interest in world affairs from his father, James Rennell Rodd, a 
senior diplomat who had headed the British mission to Ethiopia in 1897, and was ambas-
sador in Rome, 1908–19. A product of Eton and Balliol College, Oxford, his first experi-
ence in military administration came in 1917–18, when he worked in the Allied bureaus 
in Cairo and Damascus. Post-war, he had a short career in the Foreign Office (1919–24) 
before moving into finance. From 1929 to 1932 he worked at the Bank of England as an 
advisor to the Bank’s Director, Montagu Norman, and as part of this was British repre-
sentative at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930–31. From 1933 to 1961 he was 
a partner in the merchant bank, Morgan Grenfell. Banking brought him into contact with 
European high politics. In 1929 he was sent to Rome by Montagu Norman to address 
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problems at the British-Italian Bank and in that connection had a number of personal 
interviews with Mussolini.9 The Foreign Office came to regard him as a key source of 
information about the Italian economy.10 Also in the 1920s he established a reputation as 
an African explorer. Expeditions to the Mountains of Aïr in the French Sahara in 1922 
and 1927, and a widely acclaimed book on the Tuareg, People of the Veil (1926), won 
him the Royal Geographical Society’s Founders’ Medal in 1929.
For nearly a year from July 1939, Rennell worked for the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare (MEW) – an organization that he had played a role in creating.11 He was the 
Ministry’s chief negotiator in trade talks with Italy, promoting a strategy designed to give 
Britain leverage over Italy through becoming the country’s main supplier of coal.12 
Already here he demonstrated some of the characteristics that he was to display in civil 
affairs. For example, a pragmatic streak was evident when he argued that, in order to 
prepare for a possible warming of relations with Italy, a distinction needed to be drawn 
in the press and public life of England between fascism and Nazism.13 He was also out-
spoken, and easily got impatient with bureaucracy. When the trade negotiations got into 
difficulties, he blamed administrative chaos in MEW and competition between minis-
tries; and he told some of his colleagues that they were incompetent.14 There was a cer-
tain gambling instinct in his character. In one memorandum defending his approach to 
the trade negotiations, he wrote, ‘Though we may have lost our stake on the number we 
have won our stakes on the colour more than once and have kept our winnings.’15 There 
was surely some overconfidence here; as Robert Mallett has argued, Italy’s pro-German 
alignment meant it was always going to be difficult to reconcile British and Italian inter-
ests.16 It can also be argued that Rennell’s approach to the trade talks amounted to a form 
of appeasement. Not surprisingly, Rennell was eager to counter this idea. When, in 
March 1942, the former British ambassador in Rome, Percy Loraine, produced a paper 
on British–Italian relations, Rennell criticized it for giving the impression that the trade 
negotiations had been a continuation of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy, when in fact 
they were shaped by the demands of the French and British military.17
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Rennell left MEW in June 1940, and departed for West Africa on an intelligence mis-
sion to report on political allegiances in the French colonies. For this he was made a 
General Staff Officer in Military Intelligence (Research) – a unit within the War Office 
– with the rank of Captain.18 His wartime career in the War Office had its origins here. 
Initially, his work involved setting up intelligence-gathering operations in Nigeria. In 
Lagos, he was based at Government House with the Governor-General, Bernard 
Bourdillon. In August 1940 a Free French coup took place in French Equatorial Africa, 
headed by General de Larminat. With Bourdillon’s agreement, Rennell became an advi-
sor to de Larminat on economic matters – currency issues were a particular problem in 
the liberated French colonies.19 Rennell’s presence in Brazzaville brought him into regu-
lar contact with Lord Hailey – the famous author of African Survey (1938) – who was 
grappling with similar issues across the river in Leopoldville. The two men sometimes 
had walks together.20 Hailey enjoyed the interaction with Rennell. In a summary of his 
thinking on Congo and French Equatorial Africa, he wrote, ‘My personal relations with 
[Rennell] enable us to be of mutual assistance to each other in economic matters.’21
The Free French vision excited Rennell. Although pragmatic in the way he approached 
issues, ideas were important to him. ‘If we do not [believe in our ideas], we risk resorting 
to expedient after expedient and people will not sacrifice themselves for expedients’, he 
told his wife, Mary.22 While in Nigeria, Rennell saw de Gaulle on a few occasions. 
Indeed, he seems at certain points to have acted as a kind of liaison officer for him.23 He 
thought him articulate and interesting, if bad-mannered and lacking a sense of humour. 
He reported to Mary, ‘The Free French movement is interesting and worthwhile. De 
Gaulle is a remarkable man. I think the idea is gaining ground, and it is only ideas which 
are going to succeed in this world.’24
On returning to London at the end of year, Rennell was drawn into the task of setting 
up so-called Overseas Enemy Territory Administrations in the collapsing Italian Empire. 
The War Office, specifically its Directorate of Military Operations (M.O.11), was 
assigned responsibility for this, since the Foreign Office did not have experience of this 
kind of work, and to give the work to the Colonial Office would imply that the new ter-
ritories might be incorporated into the Empire.25 The plan was to use the form of military 
government adopted by General Allenby in Palestine during the First World War – which 
was for the Commander-in-Chief to govern through political officers especially appointed 
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for the work.26 The man chosen to oversee the work was the former Governor-General of 
Uganda, Philip Mitchell. Designated Chief Political Officer (CPO) in early 1941, his 
remit initially extended to the whole of North and East Africa. But in February 1942 the 
role was divided and he was made CPO South, with his headquarters in Nairobi. On 
Wavell’s suggestion, Rennell was made his Chief of Finance and Accounts, even though, 
in recommending him, Wavell warned that he could be quarrelsome.27
Rennell liked Mitchell, and sometimes deputized for him. Likewise, Mitchell enjoyed 
working with him, as well as with his legal advisor, Ralph Hone – who became CPO 
North in February 1942. Mitchell recalled that the three of them came to have an ‘almost 
uncanny mutual understanding’.28 Rennell clearly liked working in a small group in an 
informal way – a pattern that was to repeat itself on a larger scale in AMGOT. In a letter 
of April 1943, he observed, ‘With administrations such as we have built up there is a very 
large personal element in the absence of tradition. That personal element surrounded the 
originators Philip Mitchell, Ralph Hone and myself.’29 He made a similar point after the 
war; in his view, much of the success of British military rule in the ex-Italian colonies 
stemmed from the collaboration between the three of them, as well as to Mitchell’s gen-
eral principles – which he summarized as leaving all local authority with the head of a 
local administration while reserving certain matters for control from headquarters.30 
Mitchell and his team generally had to use their own initiative in addressing issues. This 
was part of the attraction. Rennell later recalled: ‘We had no precedent to work on and 
builded [sic] empirically. But we builded well with scarce human material and have 
achieved the aims that were set without famine distress or disorder.’31
In early 1941, Mitchell’s team were preoccupied with Ethiopia. On Haile Selassie’s 
return to the country after the Italian surrender, the main challenge was how to reconcile 
his desire to re-establish his authority with British military interests. The War Office and 
the Foreign Office – keen to show that Ethiopia was being given its independence – saw 
the situation differently, and, more personally, Mitchell and Eden clashed.32 A key figure 
in the complex negotiations with Addis Ababa was Deputy CPO Maurice Lush, previ-
ously Governor of the Northern Province of Sudan. Rennell was also involved. He 
attended the Asmara conference in June 1941, at which Mitchell and the Generals Wavell, 
Platt, and Cunningham were present; and he was also present with Mitchell at meetings 
at the War Office in London leading to the final Agreement and Military Convention in 
January 1942.33
The British takeover of the Italian colonies was made more complicated by the fact 
there was only a small number of administrators to handle it. Until April 1941, the 
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Political Branch of General Headquarters, Middle East, consisted of no more than nine 
officers, three other ranks, and six stenographers. Even in September 1941, the total 
number of staff available for the administration of Eritrea, Ethiopia, British Somaliland, 
and Italian Somaliland was only 270.34 It was stretching work, as Rennell explained to 
Mary: ‘I am appalled at the magnitude of the job I have and a terrible insufficiency in 
personnel to deal with it.’35 In this context there was much attraction in trying to avoid a 
direct takeover of Italian fascist and Vichy territories.
Rennell’s thinking on this issue was evident in relation to Eritrea and Italian 
Somaliland. On Eritrea, he recalled, ‘No alternative was open when Asmara fell than to 
maintain as much of the Italian administration as remained.’ When Wavell met with Eden 
in Cairo in March 1941, Rennell wrote a memorandum to inform their discussions, which 
illustrates his caution about imposing ‘direct’ British rule:
If H.M.G. are to become responsible for the direct administration of the native and Italian 
populations . . . the cost will be onerous and the actual method of government difficult . . . The 
alternative and cheaper method is to secure the co-operation of the Italian authorities to continue 
their administration under our control in Eritrea and Somaliland.
Rennell recommended a ‘modus vivendi with the Italian authorities’ while there was still 
time to take over a ‘running machine’. In the absence of contrary instructions, his 
approach was adopted in the early stages of administration in both Eritrea and Italian 
Somaliland.36
In Eritrea, where Brian Kennedy-Cooke was Deputy CPO, the approach worked best 
in the areas of municipal and technical services. In practice, it was still necessary to dismiss 
some of the more ardent fascists, and when this was the case some kind of direct rule had 
to be introduced.37 Different approaches were applied in different districts. For example, 
military defeat meant that the Italian settlers had lost much of their credibility. This meant 
that it was only in the major cities of Asmara and Massawa and their surrounding settle-
ments, and the Hamasein Plateau, that the Italian administration was initially utilized, 
although the Offices of Political and Native Affairs were closed down and their work 
transferred to the British Administration Affairs secretariat. Elsewhere, it was felt better to 
have virtually no administration at all than to prop up a decaying Italian organization. But 
in the Western Plain province a form of direct rule was adopted. There were fewer Italians 
in Italian Somaliland, but there were similar issues to grapple with. In Mogadishu the 
local fascist mayor was retained for a while in his role as head of the municipality.38
A similar approach was evident in the British approach to Madagascar. The island 
became Rennell’s main focus of concern in summer 1942, after he replaced Mitchell as 
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CPO South in June – and was given the honorary rank of Major-General. He was the 
Chief Military Administrator of the Island for a month from September 21 onwards. The 
central political problem was how to relate to the collapsing Vichy administration. 
Already after the fall of Diego Suarez in May, Lush – now redeployed to Madagascar 
from Ethiopia – started using local French administrative staff, where they were willing 
to cooperate.39 Rennell pursued a similar approach after the Vichy leader Paul Annett 
abandoned the capital Tananarive in mid-September. In a statement to the War Cabinet 
Committee of the French Resistance in November, he reported that the successful transi-
tion of power from the French to the British had been based on observing French legal 
process – which appealed to the French love of ‘matters of form’. Within three days of 
the British occupation, the whole machinery of the French administration was function-
ing satisfactorily, he declared.40 ‘So long as an apparently legal form can be observed, the 
French will swallow almost anything’, he subsequently remarked.41 He was pleased with 
the fact that an interim government was set up successfully; ‘it was really rather an 
achievement’, he told Mary.42
Rennell initially advised that only a period of extended British occupation of 
Madagascar would keep the settler population happy. The War Office also thought a 
rapid transfer of the island to the Free French would not be easy. However, the Foreign 
Office, eager to placate the Free French after they had been excluded from the invasion 
of the island, was keen to see a rapid British withdrawal.43 Rennell was soon involved in 
discussions about how to bring this about, and then present in London in December when 
a final agreement was signed by Eden and de Gaulle.44 In later arguing for the influence 
on AMGOT of Britain’s African experience in civil affairs, he remarked that the 
Madagascan campaign provided the ‘nearest analogy’ to what followed in Italy on 
account of the fact that it was a joint campaign, and also because of the way negotiations 
with the French authorities led to the termination of military government.45
Rennell’s capacity for problem-solving was also evident in Madagascar after the 
Foreign Office, in May, appointed one of its Cairo staff, Laurence Grafftey-Smith, as 
CPO in the country, at the expense of Lush in the War Office. In September, Platt over-
turned the decision, insisting that Lush had primacy. Rennell, who was answerable to 
Platt, eventually resolved the problem by giving the two men separate areas of responsi-
bility under his leadership.46 In his memoirs, Grafftey-Smith paid tribute to Rennell’s 
pragmatism in handling the problem, although he also stated that Rennell exaggerated 
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the extent of the Foreign Office’s ambitions in his summary of the episode in British 
Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa.47
The fate of the Somali peoples also absorbed Rennell’s attention. He owed some of 
his interest in this subject to his father; the borders between Abyssinian and Somali ter-
ritories had been a focus of discussion during the negotiations in 1897.48 Throughout 
1942, he was involved in discussions about the ‘reserved areas’ of Ethiopia, the parts of 
the country temporarily remaining under British military control after Haile Selassie’s 
rule was re-established. Here he was influenced by the idea of a Greater Somalia. He 
wrote in his private diary for 1943, ‘I succeeded in getting the reserved areas of Ethiopia 
consolidated so as to make possible a settlement on the basis of a Greater Somaliland.’49 
Rennell continued to support the idea of a Greater Somalia after the war, even after the 
idea of a Greater Somalia foundered in the late 1940s. Speaking in the Lords in 1955, he 
expressed pride at the fact that when he was Chief Political Officer, British Somaliland, 
Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopian Somaliland had been united under one single adminis-
tration; and he regretted the post-war partitioning of the country.50 For their defence of 
British military interests and approach to Somali issues, Mitchell and his team were 
viewed with suspicion by some pro-Ethiopian opinion. In his memoirs, the US historian 
John C. Spencer, who was an advisor to Haile Selassie from 1943 to 1960, called 
Mitchell, Rennell, and Lush a ‘military-colonial group’ that wanted a British-dominated 
Horn; and he claimed that their interpretation of Somali problems paved the way for the 
later Ethiopian–Somali conflict.51
Rennell’s emerging political outlook was as much a response to circumstance as a 
product of deep reflection about colonial or military government. But it is important to 
note that he was much influenced by figures who were strong proponents of indirect 
rule. In early 1943, he told his wife, ‘I learnt my African administration from Bourdillon 
. . . and Mitchell.’52 Bourdillon was an advocate of indirect rule, although not in its most 
radical form; he saw it as a means to the longer-term end of creating parliamentary 
institutions in Nigeria.53 Mitchell too was keen on the concept – stemming from when 
he had been Secretary of Native Affairs in Tanganyika, 1929–34. His thinking there had 
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been shaped by Donald Cameron, the Governor General of the colony from 1925 to 
1931. Cameron, in turn, had been influenced by the pioneer of indirect rule, Lord 
Lugard, although he held to a more interventionist version of the idea.54 Rennell was 
himself positive about Lugard. Following his trip to the Sahara in 1922 he wrote of the 
system ‘so successfully instituted’ by Lugard in Nigeria, contrasting it with the ‘direct’ 
French approach.55 His views on politics and military government in Africa were thus 
shaped by men who were steeped in the tradition of indirect rule. There were other fac-
tors that might have inclined him to an appreciation of the doctrine. In the 1920s he had 
developed a real affection for Tuareg culture; his friendship with the local tribesmen 
was very meaningful to him.56 There was in the idea of indirect rule an implicit endorse-
ment of such traditions. His father’s approach to diplomacy also contained a respect for 
locality.57
Rennell’s link with Lord Hailey brings in a different perspective. There was a combi-
nation of elements in Hailey’s outlook. He was never a firm advocate of indirect rule, but 
he came to appreciate the more gradualist approach of men like Bourdillon and Mitchell. 
His African Survey came to be associated with a more activist conception of trusteeship 
in Africa, and the replacement of the conception of indirect rule with the idea of ‘partner-
ship’ – a tendency connected with the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 
and 1945.58 In his Native Administration and Political Development (1942), he empha-
sized the need for the creation of an African political class capable of managing the 
modern state.59 This kind of approach would have appealed to Rennell. The two men 
sometimes took similar positions on Africa in debates in the Lords. For example, in July 
1944 Rennell proposed a motion calling on the government to put more thought into the 
education and housing of Africans returning to civilian life after the war. It was strongly 
backed by Hailey, in the light of the need for Africans to take greater responsibility for 
their own social and economic development.60 When in 1947 Lord Hailey stood down as 
chairman of the International African Institute – initially founded by Lugard – he nomi-
nated Rennell in his place.61
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Rennell was not convinced that indirect rule offered a long-term way forward for 
Africa. Speaking in the Lords in August 1944, he noted that indirect rule was generally 
thought of as ‘liberal’, and direct rule as ‘reactionary’. But he countered that direct rule 
did not always have to be reactionary, and that native administrations could be ‘extremely 
reactionary’. More specifically, he questioned the policy of extending indirect rule as 
applied in the northern parts of Nigeria and the Gold Coast to the south.62 A year later, in 
a speech prior to the General Election, Rennell warned against ‘enthusiastic anthropo-
logical administrators’ trying to wrap the African up in ‘cotton wool’ to protect him from 
the outside world.63 Such comments indicate that Rennell’s enthusiasm for indirect rule 
in East Africa was more a pragmatic response to a wartime need than a permanent philo-
sophical commitment to the doctrine. It also suggests that he is better seen as a pragmatic 
reformist than a traditionalist.
Rennell left Africa with the conviction that the empire needed significant reform. This 
is evident in his thinking on organizational questions in the British colonies. His War 
Office work led him to believe that there needed to be greater integration in the empire. 
For example, he wanted Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) to be integrated into British plans 
for East Africa. He discussed his ideas in London in April 1943 with George Gater, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies, and Arthur Dawe, Head of the Colonial 
Office’s Africa Division – a man who took the view that indirect rule was an outmoded 
method of government; apparently they found his ideas ‘novel’. He also shared his think-
ing with the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley.64 In a debate in the Lords in late 1945, he 
complained that the administrative divisions existing in British East Africa and the Indian 
Ocean made little sense, and there needed to be a more cohesive plan for the area.65
More generally, Rennell’s work in Africa led him to formulate his own philosophy of 
decision-making, which, in its pragmatism and gradualism, reinforced wider influences. 
He wrote to his wife in November 1942,
The process of letting things happen and letting decisions make themselves has become more 
deep-seated, inescapable and satisfactory. Even the major ones in my work of a political and 
technical nature have made themselves – that is they reached a point at which no other decision 
really rationally presented itself as an alternative.66
II
In the light of his experience in Africa, it is not surprising that Rennell emerged as a 
candidate to lead AMGOT. In early 1943 there were plans for him to take on the wider 
role of Inspector General of Civil Affairs in Africa. But in February the Secretary of State 
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for War, P.J. Grigg – with whom Rennell had a good rapport – proposed him for the 
AMGOT job. At the end of April he formally relinquished his role as CPO in East Africa 
– a job that had been re-titled Chief Civil Affairs Officer – and he became CCAO of 
AMGOT when it came into being on 1 May.67
AMGOT was always a difficult compromise in terms of who had ultimate authority. 
The lines of accountability were eventually organized in such a way as to try to please all 
parties, but leave the main source of authority with the US military. Washington’s initial 
choice to be its head was the Mayor of New York, Fiorello H. LaGuardia, a reform-
minded but authoritarian figure, to whom the British were not sympathetic. When 
Rennell was appointed instead, he was made answerable to the head of 15th Army Group, 
General Alexander – who was responsible for nominating him – as Military Governor of 
Sicily. In turn, Alexander reported to Eisenhower, but through the medium of the US 
Brigadier-General Julius Holmes, head of the Military Government Section at AFHQ.68 
Many of the difficulties that occurred over the next few months had their roots in this 
arrangement.69 The plan for government in Sicily was first formulated by the US 
Lieutenant C.M. Spofford, and then approved by Rennell with some amendments. The 
idea was for civil affairs officers to be attached to advancing units, so as to make it pos-
sible for them to take charge of vacated areas.70
One of Rennell’s initial tasks was to supervise a programme of education for civil 
affairs at Chrea, south of Algiers. This included Italian language instruction, lectures on 
military government with reference to Italy; committee work in specialist areas; and 
physical training.71 A key aspect of the training was the fostering of British–American 
unity. This was not easy. In a talk at Chatham House in February 1944, Rennell declared 
that the ‘Anglo–American fusion’ created in AMGOT had been ‘outstandingly success-
ful and complete’. But he also noted that British and American servicemen had ‘com-
plained horribly’ about being required to sleep in the same houses and eat together – even 
if they had ended up as good friends.72 Initially, Rennell himself was quite dismissive of 
some of the Americans – most of whom were new to the challenges of military govern-
ment. He described the US police officers as ‘college men with no training as soldiers’, 
and called his deputy, Brigadier-General Frank McSherry, ‘a nice old thing with no con-
ception of what it is all about’ – although he was soon impressed with his handling of the 
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temperamental General Patton.73 He warmed to the Americans. In August, he reported 
that the US officers in AMGOT had done ‘very well’, showing ‘enterprise, ingenuity and 
tremendous keenness’, ‘exceeding expectations’.74
An important difference between the British and Americans was over how to deal 
with local fascist leaders. To begin with, Washington took the view that fascist officials 
should be removed, whereas the British were more pragmatic.75 Rennell himself was 
conscious that some fascists had practical skills that were much needed, and conversely 
that not all anti-fascists were law-abiding citizens. He also saw a difference between the 
fascist party itself, which needed to be quickly suppressed, and institutions operating 
within the fascist system, which might have some continuing use. Indirect rule gave him 
the rationale for taking a gradualist and pragmatic approach to these issues. He pushed 
the concept forcefully, playing a central role in persuading Alexander and Eisenhower of 
its merits. Eisenhower initially gave him verbal instructions to proceed on this basis.76 
Recalling these discussions in early 1944, Rennell wrote,
On the basis of the rulings I had received from the Commander-in-Chief about indirect rule, I 
made an estimate of the staff required on the supposition that the Italian administrative machine 
would be kept in existence subject to early removal of dangerous Fascists and the progressive, 
but not immediate removal of all Fascists which I did not regard as practical.77
Of course, in seeking to make use of local institutions and personnel, Rennell was fol-
lowing a model that he and others had already deployed in Africa. But whereas in the 
former Italian colonies the British deployed Italian settlers to do some of their admin-
istration, it was now an indigenous Italian population that was to be the vehicle for 
Allied rule.
Rennell’s thinking was particularly evident in a memorandum he produced in April, 
in which he argued that Allied administrators should not replace local prefects, but sit 
alongside them and explain what AMGOT wanted done. Prefects would then issue orders 
to their subordinates in their own names. The aim was to avoid giving the impression that 
the Allies were establishing a government of their own. Rennell stressed the relevance of 
indirect rule on a number of grounds: it required fewer officers; local officials were more 
likely to remain obedient to their superiors; fewer language difficulties would arise; there 
was an incentive for people to remain at work when they had a chance of filling the posts 
of their superiors; there was less danger of a general strike; administrative breakdowns 
were less likely to be attributed to the Allies; education of the local administrative 
machine was more likely when there were fewer dismissals; and it provided reassurance 
that there would be no general annexation. He also thought indirect rule less complicated 
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from a budgetary point of view, since it protected AMGOT from having to absorb local 
personnel onto its payroll – because a local treasury system would be maintained.78
There was a wider issue at stake here, relating to the extent to which a military gov-
ernment should have a political agenda of its own. Rennell was critical of the ‘reformer 
spirit’ in some of his US colleagues. Many of them, he observed, thought in terms of 
‘recasting the Italian social and governmental structure’; even at Chrea they were dis-
cussing social security plans and the future fiscal system for Italy. In his mind, this failed 
to take into account the fact that the role of the military government was to operate on a 
‘maintenance basis’, before giving way either to a national administration under an 
Armistice Commission, or a more formal Allied civil administration. For this to happen, 
it was necessary to keep in existence as much as possible of the local administrative 
machinery. This, he insisted, was the rationale behind his emphasis on indirect as opposed 
to direct rule. His concerns about reformism seem to have fallen on deaf ears: ‘In vain I 
pointed out that this was not a function of military government and was a concern of the 
Italian people themselves under the government of their own choice, which liberated 
nations had been promised under the Atlantic charter.’79
US military planners were well aware of the need to take account of local sensitivities. 
Their Field Manual 27-5 (1940), which formed the basis for the School of Military 
Government set up in Charlottesville, Virginia in 1942, stressed the need for military gov-
ernment to take account of local laws, customs, and institutions. It also stated that local 
governmental institutions in occupied areas should be permitted to continue, unless mili-
tary necessity or some other cogent reasons required otherwise.80 This kind of principle 
was evident in the planning for Operation Torch in autumn 1942, when it was insisted that 
as far as possible the French civilian administration should be kept intact – even though in 
this case the occupied area was regarded as ‘friendly liberated’ rather than ‘enemy’ terri-
tory.81 Yet there was suspicion of British imperialism on the American side; some saw their 
own history of military government as more benign than European examples.82
It was only in mid-June that Roosevelt agreed to decisions about the removal of prom-
inent fascists being left to the discretion of the military commander, Alexander. The 
formula expressing this, which was not finalized until the end of the month, cautioned 
that permanent appointments of Italian officials would not be made without the agree-
ment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
The replacement of any prefects and mayors of important communities . . . will rest with the 
military commander. He will decide whether the functioning of Military Government is better 
served by the appointments of officers of the Occupation Forces or by the use of the services of 
Boobbyer 15
 83 Rennell to Alexander, 29 January 1944, p. 11; Harris, Allied Military Administration, p. 4; 
Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, p. 173.
 84 A.M.G.O.T. Plan, Proclamation and Instructions (Palermo, September 1943), p. 29.
 85 Rennell, ‘Monthly Report for August 1943’, p. 9, NA, CAB 122/442; Coles and Weinberg, 
Civil Affairs, p. 202. Harris, Allied Military Administration, pp. 41, 48–9.
 86 Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, p. 284; Ellwood, Italy, 1943–1945, p. 58.
 87 Peter Rodd, cited in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs, p. 279.
 88 Williams, Allies and Italians under Occupation, p. 21.
 89 Rennell, ‘Notes in Reply to Comments Made in House of Commons Debate 3 August 1943’, 
p. 1, Rennell Papers, Nuffield College, Oxford, Box 7.
 90 Rennell to Alexander, 29 January 1944, p. 32.
Italian officials. No actual appointment of Italian officials to important posts, as distinct from 
their temporary use, will be made until it has been approved by the two Governments through 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
As Rennell observed, the ‘whole structure and policy’ of the AMGOT administration as 
he had conceived it depended on having this agreed.83 The wording of AMGOT’s 
Proclamation No. 1, which had already been drafted, reflected Rennell’s thinking, in that 
it directed all local Italian officials in provinces and communes to remain in office, unless 
removed by the order of the military commander.84
The invasion itself took place on 9/10 July. By the end of August, all prefects from 
pre-occupation days had been removed. Most mayors were also dismissed, if they had 
not fled to the mainland. But vice-prefects and deputy mayors were often permitted to 
remain.85 Concurrently, a concerted effort was made to draw local society into provincial 
administration. Rennell explained his thinking on this in a September directive:
I think it is desirable that, with the fatherly blessing if not the official approval of AMGOT 
which cannot make constitutional changes yet, a small council be set up in each commune to 
assist the mayor, take some of the responsibility off his shoulders and explain the necessity of 
unpopular measures to their constituents.
He went on to suggest that these councils should include representatives from different 
classes and interests, including local farmers; and that priests, doctors, and schoolmas-
ters could be useful in building links with the community. In consequence, there emerged 
what David Ellwood has called a ‘de facto alliance’ between Allied authorities in the 
provinces and the most prominent local citizens.86 But finding citizens who were ready 
for this kind of responsibility was not easy. Rennell’s brother, Peter – who was Senior 
Civil Affairs Officer in the central Sicilian province of Enna – observed that Italian offi-
cials had become so accustomed to shelving responsibility that it was sometimes neces-
sary to force them to assume it.87 For policing AMGOT relied heavily on the local 
Carabinieri – for the obvious reason that the number of Allied policemen needed to 
enforce order was too great to countenance.88 Rennell thought the Carabinieri were 
important for keeping the Mafia in check.89 He found the church ‘neutrally helpful’, in 
the sense that it preached acceptance and cooperation with the Allies, but refrained from 
denouncing Mafiosi or dangerous fascist influences.90
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Already at Chrea, Rennell warned of the dangers of the Mafia.91 Seeing it as ‘less a 
secret society than an attitude of mind’, he was conscious that no Italian government had 
succeeded in stamping it out completely, even taking into account Prefect Mori’s efforts 
in the late 1920s. He saw it as a ‘racket organization’, but one which had played a con-
siderable political role. Already in mid-August, he reported a growth in Mafia activity. 
Part of the problem, he observed, was simply that war itself and the breakdown of author-
ity accompanying it provided a good ‘culture ground for the virus’.92 ‘Unruly elements’ 
often took advantage of the relative chaos that followed the Allied occupation of an 
area.93 A case can be made for saying that indirect rule was not well suited to dealing with 
the criminal possibilities in this situation; indeed Harris argues that it was a ‘definite 
failure’ in suppressing the black market, although he also notes that direct rule might not 
have been much better. In particular, he pointed the blame at the Agents of Public Safety 
– those responsible for criminal investigation – as partly responsible, noting that they had 
been more corrupted by fascism.94
Rennell tried to be tough. When a local landowner, Baron Genuardo, was murdered, 
he had the suspects – who were Mafiosi – tried in a military court rather than by local 
jury, in order to ensure that death sentences were given and carried out immediately.95 
But distinguishing members of the Mafia was not easy, as he subsequently explained:
With the people clamouring to be rid of a Fascist Podestà, many of my officers fell into the trap 
of selecting the most forthcoming self-advertiser. . . . The choices in more than one instance fell 
on the local ‘Mafia’ boss or his shadow, who in one or two cases had graduated in an American 
gangster environment.96
Conscious that some imprisoned Mafiosi were genuinely anti-fascist, Rennell still warned 
that they were not people to whom clemency could be extended on the grounds that they 
were political prisoners.97 He later blamed the Americans for releasing some anti-fascist 
prisoners, who were in fact Mafiosi. He also strongly rejected suggestions that the Allies 
encouraged a recrudescence of the Mafia for the purpose of fighting the Germans.98 His 
interpretation of how organized crime re-emerged under AMGOT is essentially in line 
with the view of writer Tim Newark that it was through ‘misunderstanding and adminis-
trative overstretch’, and ‘by mistake’, that AMGOT created space for the Mafia.99
Boobbyer 17
100 John Dickie, Mafia Brotherhoods: The Rise of the Italian Mafias (London, 2012), 
pp. 353–6.
101 Rennell, ‘Monthly Report for August 1943’, p. 3.
102 Rennell, report of 20 August 1943, p. 3, NA, WO 221/312; Harris, Allied Military 
Administration, p. 59.
103 Rennell, ‘Monthly Report for August 1943’, p. 3.
104 Newark, Mafia Allies, p. 218.
105 Rennell to Alexander, 29 January 1944, p. 12; Newark, Mafia Allies, p. 219.
106 Poletti to McCoy, 27 September 1943, cited in Matthew Jones, Britain, the United States 
and the Mediterranean War, 1942–44 (London, 1996), p. 94. For the September report on 
Palermo province, including some tensions with AMGOT headquarters, see NARA, ACC, 
10106/115/23.
107 Rennell, ‘Memorandum on AMG and ACC’, 30 December 1943, p. 1, RRP, BL, Box 111; 
Harris, Allied Military Administration, pp. 95–6.
More personally, one historian has speculated that Rennell’s aristocratic background 
may have blinded him to the fact that some of Sicily’s landed families had Mafia connec-
tions, citing as evidence for this AMGOT’s appointment as Mayor of Palermo of the 
landowner Lucio Tasca Bordonaro – a man from a separatist family with Mafia links.100 
This is not impossible, for in his report for August 1943 Rennell did remark that the 
Tasca family was ‘commendably cooperating’ on straightforward administrative ques-
tions;101 but it seems unlikely, given Rennell’s consistent wariness of the Mafia. He was 
certainly conscious of the Tasca family’s links to separatism – and he was keen to sup-
press signs of separatism.102 He was also aware of the fact that some local dignitaries 
wanted to curry favour from him. In one report, he remarked that Finocchiaro Aprile, 
another separatist leader from a liberal ruling family, was trying to take up certain issues 
with him with the view to securing his recognition as a local leader.103 As a possible 
conduit for Mafia influence, Newark points the finger rather at Charles Poletti, an Italian 
American who had briefly been Governor of New York, and was Senior Civil Affairs 
Officer in Palermo – and who was responsible for Tasca’s appointment.104 Rennell and 
Poletti were wary of each other. Rennell did not like Poletti’s ‘appetite for press public-
ity’ and warned against his appointment to a senior role in the ACC.105 For his part, 
Poletti found Rennell lacking in knowledge of government administration. He also 
thought him superficial in his analysis of problems and disinclined to liberal democratic 
solutions to issues.106
On 3 September, fighting moved to the mainland, and a month later two new admin-
istrative districts – Calabria and Lucania – were added to the responsibility of 15th Army 
Group. At this point AMGOT was split into AMG Forward and Rear areas, with Rennell 
in command of the former and McSherry the latter, but with both remaining under the 
command of Alexander. Rennell spent an increasing amount of time alongside Alexander 
in Bari. Rennell later suggested that the creation of these two potentially competing cen-
tres of authority was a mistake.107 The situation was made more complicated when it was 
decided to permit the existence of an Italian government, under Prime Minister Badoglio, 
in the province of Apulia, with headquarters in Brindisi. It was decided that an Allied 
Military Government would not be imposed there, but that AMGOT representatives 
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would act as liaison officers and have considerable influence. It was thought that capital 
would be gained by stating that military government would only be installed when it was 
essential for military operations.108
Further complexity was created with the formation on 11 November of the ACC, the 
body designed to take over from AMGOT. This soon had the character of a ‘large, mili-
tary bureaucracy’.109 Rennell was unhappy with how it was set up, in particular with the 
fact that it was created and trained separately in Algiers, and not on the basis of AMGOT. 
In his view, the result of this was that when the ACC came into being, its officers often 
found themselves superior in rank and inferior in experience to those whose work they 
took over. Rennell was also worried about its size: ‘The number of officers, and in many 
cases their training and background, leave me in doubt whether the Italian Government 
would ever survive being overlaid by such a nursery governess. The authority of the 
Prefectorial Government in the provinces will never survive so numerous a staff.’110 In 
Rennell’s mind, the ACC as constituted pointed more in the direction of direct rather than 
indirect rule, and in this sense it ran counter to the political philosophy he had been so 
strongly promoting. As he observed, ‘The more men available in the field the more direct 
administration they will try to undertake.’ He found his concerns shared by the Soviet 
representative on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy, Andrei Vyshinsky.111
Rennell also thought the existence of a ‘nomadic’ ACC administration added to the 
problems connected with managing AMG Forward and Rear, and overseeing the areas 
under Italian rule. Indeed, he thought the ACC was responsible for some of the economic 
and civil supply problems that became pressing as the Allies advanced into Naples and 
beyond. He was also dismissive of the abilities of the American General chosen to head 
the ACC, Kenyon Joyce, and thought there was a tendency under him to ‘Americanize’ 
the culture at ACC headquarters. In leaving AMGOT, he shared his concerns about Joyce 
with Eisenhower, painting a stark picture of how bad things had become.112 Harold 
Macmillan, Churchill’s representative at AFHQ, also had a low opinion of Joyce.113
Rennell attributed many of these problems to the Military Government Section at 
AFHQ. He had originally hoped the Military Government Section would be a channel of 
communication between AMGOT and AFHQ, but already in June was concerned that it 
was starting to become a policymaking body in its own right.114 To his frustration, it 
turned into the main channel of communication with Washington and London on matters 
relating to AMGOT and the ACC, with him and Alexander being kept out of the loop. He 
was particularly unhappy about being excluded from discussions about the future 
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government in Rome; he was informed by the Military Government Section that he 
would not be involved in the Armistice Commission, nor in any Allied organization in 
Rome – in the event that there was no Italian government.115 He also thought the Military 
Government Section presented its plans as emanating from the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff, when in fact the Combined Chiefs had simply approved the plans submitted to 
them. He was particularly concerned with the leadership of the Military Government 
Section. He was suspicious of Holmes’s ambition and lack of administrative experience. 
He also thought his British deputy, Colonel Terence Maxwell, lacked governmental 
experience; he was frequently engaged in trying to ‘drive my car from the back seat’, he 
observed. More broadly, he thought the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and 
their Civil Affairs committees, were too distant from events and too much like a post 
office for the departments of the different governments to be really effective.116
These administrative tensions, and the practical issues arising from them, affected 
Rennell’s mood. In the course of the autumn, he swung from exhilaration to depression. 
In early October he was in a broadly positive frame of mind. Following a journey through 
Allied-occupied Italy, he wrote to Spofford that Calabria was ‘less unhappy’ than he had 
expected; and, in the light of a visit he had just made to Naples, he suggested that they 
would soon be ‘out of the woods’ in addressing food-supply problems in the city, although 
he warned of a lack of water and electricity.117 But a few weeks later, he was gloomy and 
pessimistic. To Grigg he described Allied initiatives in Italy as ‘operations Dogsbreakfast 
and Catshit’, and said, ‘It is beginning to dawn even on Holmes and Maxwell that they 
have committed a MFU.’ He also observed that he was not himself popular at AFHQ: 
‘They do not want me here and will be very thankful to see the last of me.’ He also said 
he was ‘very tired mentally’ and ‘ripe to make a first class mess soon’ – citing as cause 
of this the absence of time off during the war.118 This was the background to his decision 
to leave Italy altogether rather than continue work with the ACC after it took over. He 
turned down the vice-presidency of the Economic and Administrative Section of the 
ACC – on the grounds that he did not approve of how it was constituted.119 He was 
replaced by Lush – AFHQ’s original choice for the role of CCAO – and returned to the 
UK in mid-December.120
Rennell’s influence is felt throughout Harris’s account of AMGOT. Indeed, Harris 
clearly had access to Rennell’s overview of AMGOT written in January 1944.121 Like 
Rennell, Harris charged the ACC with being responsible for some of the food-supply 
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problems of autumn 1943. He was also critical of AFHQ; in his version of events, it was 
AFHQ in Algiers, rather than Rennell or the Advanced Echelon of AFHQ in Naples, that 
was responsible for food shortages in the winter. The administrative confusion of the 
period also comes across forcefully in Harris’s account: ‘The . . . chaos will be remem-
bered by those who took part in it as an administrative nightmare, of successive and often 
contradictory policies, the details of which were circulated (or more often failed to circu-
late) between five headquarters and two continents.’122 But Harris also observed that the 
unification of AMG Forward and Rear under the ACC simplified things. He also 
remarked that Rennell’s initial concept for the Military Government Section – which was 
to be something like a ‘post office’ for transmitting information – was ‘perhaps not really 
practical’.123 In the light of Rennell’s influence on Harris, this may point to a subsequent 
evolution in Rennell’s own views, reflecting a realization that the takeover of Italy inevi-
tably brought with it a growth of bureaucracy.
Back in the UK Rennell was in the public eye. The Illustrated London News had him 
as one of their ‘personalities of the week’ in late July.124 But he was a controversial figure 
on the left. There were articles in The New Statesman and Nation suggesting that he was 
too closely associated with Italian business interests.125 Hugh Dalton – whose appoint-
ment as head of MEW in 1940 had prompted Rennell’s departure from the organization 
– once said that were Rennell to be influential in Italy, he would draw in ‘undesirable’ 
industrialists like the Venetian businessman Giuseppe Volpi.126 He clearly had a reputa-
tion for being close to the Italian ‘party of business’ – moderate fascists, like Volpi, who 
were discreetly in favour of Italian neutrality.127 Left-wingers were suspicious of this. In 
parliament, the Labour MP Tom Driberg expressed concern that AMGOT as constituted 
would always tend to leave in office ‘more of the official Fascist functionaries than we 
would wish left in office’; and the deputy Labour leader, Arthur Greenwood, said that 
Rennell and his associates were not the kind of people who would be likely to have 
the interests of the workers and peasants of Sicily at heart.128 A month later the Labour 
MP, Richard Stokes, suggested that AMGOT represented the ‘most reactionary’ elements 
and that Rennell was a ‘diehard tory’. He retracted this last point, perhaps because in 
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the Lords Rennell sat with the Liberals – although he switched to the Conservatives after 
the war.129
The attacks prompted a statement from Eden, insisting that AMGOT’s aims were 
practical rather than political, and that it was doing ‘very fine work’. He mentioned that 
the fascist leaders of all nine Sicilian prefectures had been removed and arrested, or had 
fled; and he distinguished the Carabinieri from the Italian secret police, the Ovra, noting 
that if use had not been made of the former, at least 10,000 British troops would have 
been required to do the job.130 But Eden did not defend Rennell himself. Exactly why is 
not clear, but his previous disagreements with Mitchell, which Rennell was party to, and 
the broader tensions between the Foreign Office and War Office, were probably factors. 
But it is also likely that there was a personal dimension to their differences. In his diaries, 
Dalton reports an occasion in late 1942 in which Eden was ‘indescribably rude’ to 
Rennell – although he does not explain in what connection.131 Eden was apparently not 
supportive of his appointment to the AMGOT post.132
Opinion on Rennell was clearly divided. In some, he inspired great loyalty. For exam-
ple, G.R. Gayre, a Scottish educationalist who worked for AMGOT, praised him for 
choosing an excellent staff and having confidence in it:
Having chosen a staff, he reposes confidence in it. Furthermore, there is no question of rank or 
‘channels’ here. He is ready of access and it is a question of a direct approach between head of 
a division and the General, or General McSherry, or the Chief of Staff, whichever might be 
most readily accessible. The result is that there is both freedom and rapidity of action and 
decision.
According to Gayre, Rennell’s strength lay in the fact that he was a civilian not a soldier. 
Indeed, he was very positive about AMGOT’s civilian character. When AMGOT came to 
an end, he wrote,
Here . . . passes away the Rennell regime which has always kept a strong informal civilian 
touch about it, and its replacement by a body of officers, many of them high-ranking, who 
whether drawn from the regular army or not, tend to have in their ranks an unduly large 
proportion who think more of ‘channels’ than getting the job done.
Military government of Rennell’s kind was efficient because it was informal, he said.133
Gayre hints at the fact that some of the tensions in AMGOT were not simply about 
whether the British or Americans should have predominance, but also about the charac-
ter of the American military and whether or not it should be in ultimate control. This had 
been a source of tension in Washington itself. When the School of Military Government 
was set up, there was suspicion amongst some of Roosevelt’s staff that it could prove a 
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vehicle for conservative military ideas. It took some persuasion by Henry Stimson, 
Secretary of State for War, to persuade Roosevelt of the soundness of the School’s vision. 
The US military was always insistent that its control of military operations in the field 
should be unhindered. For example, Eisenhower insisted that the State Department rep-
resentative on his staff, Robert Murphy, was not independently accountable to 
Washington; and when in 1943 the Combined Civil Affairs Committee was set up in 
Washington to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was organized in such a way as to 
leave the ultimately authority with the military.134
Macmillan was also positive about Rennell, although with reservations. Writing in his 
diary in August, he described him as ‘awfully good at his job’, and ‘quick, intelligent and 
persistent’, but adding that he was sometimes impulsive and took decisions too rapidly. 
AMGOT itself impressed him; in early September, he called it a ‘great piece of organisa-
tion, in view of the difficulties’. But at the beginning of November – a time when Rennell 
was more pessimistic – his assessment was less generous. He called him a ‘great prima 
donna and prime intriguer’, suggesting that he was determined to resign from AMGOT 
if he could not be head of the new body. People like Rennell and Joyce were ‘plotting and 
worrying’ about their jobs, he remarked.135 Some found Rennell’s demeanour off- 
putting. General Montgomery – in charge of the 8th Army – thought him ‘pompous’ 
when they met in the early autumn.136 He was eccentric to some of the Americans. A US 
serviceman in AMGOT, Stephen Mavis, remarked on his habit of ‘gracefully indulging 
in a piece of snuff taken from a silver snuff box’, noting that he remained a ‘continuing 
source of curiosity’ to the Americans.137 Something of his character was doubtless pre-
sent in Lord Runcin, a snuff-taking AMGOT leader in John Hersey’s Pulitzer Prize-
winning novel, A Bell for Adano (1944) – a man with a ‘purely colonial point of view’ 
towards the Italians.138
III
Rennell did not return to war work after leaving AMGOT. He turned down an offer to be 
Director of Civil Affairs (M.O.11 had been re-titled the Directorate of Civil Affairs), cit-
ing a lack of backing from the Foreign Office.139 Instead, he relaunched his career at 
Morgan Grenfell, started to build up a profile in the House of Lords, and took on the 
Presidency of the Royal Geographical Society (1945–48). The range of these activities 
points to the fact that in his outlook he was more a generalist than a specialist. He was 
conscious of this; he once called himself a ‘jack of all trades’.140 It also suggests that in 
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professional terms he should not be seen primarily as a military administrator. He liked 
having a variety of projects on the go, and the freedom to pursue them. Yet it is under-
standable why a man of his character and expertise, and pragmatic instincts, would thrive 
in a fluid wartime situation. His career is testimony to the way in which military conflict 
can throw up opportunities for people they would not otherwise have had. Indeed, many 
from his background had influence during the war.141
Rennell was a pragmatist in his approach to military administration. This came out in 
his desire as far as possible to prevent administrative collapse in occupied countries. In 
this connection, he saw the value in taking over Italian and French administrative struc-
tures in Africa. John Darwin has made the point that colonial governments were often 
enfeebled by their lack of staff and resources, and that indirect rule was often just a con-
venient excuse for inaction.142 British military administration in Africa was clearly 
another example of a huge operation run with a minimum of resources, where the avoid-
ance of direct rule had a major attraction. AMGOT faced similar challenges. For Rennell 
in his capacity as CCAO, indirect rule gave intellectual legitimacy to a practical neces-
sity. It would be wrong to see him as a deep thinker on the subject of indirect rule – 
although that does not mean that he had only a superficial acquaintance with Africa and 
Italy. He was a practical man, responding to certain wartime challenges. His readiness to 
adapt the terminology of direct and indirect rule to a number of different contexts rein-
forces the idea that indirect rule was more a set of attitudes than a clearly defined doc-
trine.143 At the same time, his thinking had its origins in a network of colonial 
administrators well versed in the traditions of indirect rule.
Rennell’s enthusiasm for indirect rule was also connected with his belief that military 
government needed to be transitional. In Italy, this meant arguing for a minimum of 
Allied interference, pending an Italian rather than an Allied decision about the country’s 
future. In a sense, he was promoting the idea that AMGOT had a duty to be non-political. 
Whether this was wholly realistic can perhaps be doubted. As Colin Newbury has 
observed, one of the problems with indirect rule as an administrative typology is that it 
misses the political character of colonial government.144 There was a conservative ten-
dency in Rennell’s thinking here. In using the doctrine of indirect rule to try to protect 
Italy from overzealous US plans for reform, Rennell was using a rationale familiar to 
colonialists eager to keep the forces of modernization at bay. But he also knew that indi-
rect rule had limitations. Like Lord Hailey, he was conscious that a more systematic 
approach to the development of the empire was needed.
Rennell’s frustrations in autumn 1943 came partly from the bureaucratic confusion 
arising out of the creation of the ACC. He did not like the way the ACC was created, and 
the fact that its size seemed to point more in the direction of direct rather than indirect 
rule. He was also unhappy at being sidelined from key decisions about Italy’s future. In 
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a broad sense, his frustrations can be seen as a reaction to the power of the US military 
at AFHQ and elsewhere. But there was a more personal dimension to his view of events; 
he thought the Military Government Section at AFHQ, and in particular two individuals 
– Holmes and Maxwell – contributed in considerable measure to the mistakes of that 
time; and he was angry at the appointment of Joyce. The fact that the challenges facing 
Rennell would have tested anyone means that the matter of his personality should not be 
overemphasized. On the other hand, it is clear that at some level his character was a fac-
tor in the way he responded to events. As Macmillan observed, there was a temperamen-
tal quality to his reactions. In his memoirs, Lush observed that Rennell was inclined to 
make ‘heavy weather over ordinary problems’.145 Setting aside the possibility of some 
professional jealousy here – for Rennell rose quickly to be Lush’s superior – this is well 
put. Rennell had a tendency to overdramatize situations.
Rennell’s bluntness and force of personality, although they had a down side, meant 
that he exuded an air of authority. He was a tough-minded person, capable of taking a 
strong stance on issues. This was evident in his dealings with the Mafia. His post-war 
contributions in the Lords reinforce this sense of a man ready to take robust action, where 
he thought it necessary. For example, in response to the Mao Mao rebellion, he suggested 
that Britain should be ready to inflict ‘collective punishment’ on the Kenyan population; 
and he was associated with the right-wing ‘Suez Group’ which in the years before the 
Suez Crisis tried to pressure the Conservative government into maintaining its Suez 
Canal Base.146 But he was reform-minded too. His enthusiasm for the Free French cause 
and the Great Somalia project suggests a man with some idealism and conviction. Later, 
as Ghana approached independence, he was keen to ensure that constitutional safeguards 
against authoritarian rule were maintained in the country.147 There was, then, a mixture 
of tendencies in Rennell’s mentality: authoritarian and conservative on the one hand, and 
liberal and reformist on the other.
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